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In his forthcoming book, Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with 
Linguistic Pragmatism, Michael Devitt raises, once again, the debate be-
tween minimalism and pragmatism to defend the former. He claims that, 
by taking some overlooked conventions into account, a semantic notion of 
what is said is possible. In this paper, we claim that a semantic notion of 
what is said is not possible, especially if some overlooked compositional 
conventions are considered. If, as Devitt defends, verbal activity is more 
linguistically constrained, compositional linguistic rules should be in-
cluded in his catalogue of overlooked conventions and this entails an 
important challenge to the minimalist claim that the semantic view of 
what is said can handle all context relative phenomena. In this paper, 
we argue that, when conventions concerning compositionality are not 
overlooked, modulation should be added to the two qualifi cations (dis-
ambiguation and saturation) accepted by Devitt in the constitution of 
what is said. Thus, what is said is not always literally said and the 
traditional semantic view of what is said cannot be saved.
Keywords: Linguistic conventions, semantics, pragmatics, what is 
said, minimalism, linguistic pragmatism.
1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss the account of Michael Devitt’s notion of what 
is said in his latest book Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with 
* A version of this article was given at the Mental Phenomena course (Dubrovnik 
2018) where Michael Devitt’s latest book was discussed. We wish to express our 
gratitude to the members of that audience for various discussions and insightful 
comments. Thanks also to John Keating for suggestions on an earlier draft. This 
research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and 
Universities through the project PGC2018-098236-B-I00.
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Linguistic Pragmatism (forthcoming)1 and in one of his previous pub-
lications, “Is there a Place for Truth-Conditional Pragmatics?” (2013). 
In these works, Devitt gives his particular defence of the “traditional 
view” and argues that the constitution of what is said is “semantic”. 
This traditional view stems from Paul Grice (1975/89) and has also 
been defended recently by Emma Borg (2012), Kepa Korta and John 
Perry (2011), Ernie Lepore and Mathews Stone (2015), among others. 
Although these authors do not agree on everything, they propose the 
minimalist thesis according to which a sentential utterance has a prop-
osition as its semantic content. That proposition, a minimal proposi-
tion, is a complete truth-conditional content obtained simply by virtue 
of the lexico-syntactic rules and the context required by ambiguous or 
context-sensitive expressions.2
In some of our previous works we have already given arguments 
against this minimalist thesis. We have rejected Borg’s minimalist po-
sition arguing that her defence of minimal propositions against prag-
matist objections does not serve to avoid other objections which arise 
from compositional context-sensitivity (Romero and Soria 2019). We 
have also challenged Lepore and Stone’s semanticist claim that prag-
matic reasoning never contributes content to utterances (Romero and 
Soria 2016). Now we turn to Devitt’s defence of minimalism against 
pragmatism. Taking into account that although there is a certain de-
gree of overlap with other minimalists’ arguments, Devitt’s rejection of 
pragmatism focuses on an aspect that deserves specifi c attention: his 
claim that pragmatists generally overlook some linguistic conventions. 
This claim, however, is not entirely new. There are both semanti-
cists, such as Lepore and Stone (2015), and pragmatists, such as our-
selves (Romero and Soria 2016, 2019), claiming that there are over-
looked conventions, although they are different and both differ from 
Devitt’s. Lepore and Stone claim that there are conventions related to 
discourse coherence and other aspects of meaning that are linguisti-
cally encoded but are not truth-conditional in nature. Devitt focuses on 
those linguistic rules that demand slot-fi lling of regular elements of a 
certain type, which are claimed to form a part of the truth-conditional 
content of the sentence uttered. Instead, we defend that there are some 
1 From now on when we refer to Devitt without specifying the date of publication, 
we are making reference to his proposals from a draft (December 2018) of his 
forthcoming book. We will only specify “forthcoming” when we quote textually from 
this version (with pages still unavailable).
2 Strictly speaking, semantic content of a sentential utterance as a minimal 
proposition opposes non-propositional conceptions of semantic content such as 
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/95) or Bach’s (2006). According to the latter, given a 
sentence token, it is not possible to determine what state of affairs should obtain 
for such a sentence to be true. However, Devitt’s proposal not only opposes non-
propositional conceptions of semantic content but also what is pragmatically said 
(the notion defended in linguistic pragmatism) since his notion of semantic content, 
what the sentential utterance says, is what is said by the speaker in case speaker’s 
meaning includes what is said.
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compositional linguistic rules which impose certain type constraints in 
relation to some core elements and which sometimes demand contex-
tual adjustment (modulation or slot-fi lling) to get the truth-conditional 
content expressed by the speaker. The focus is clearly different in these 
three approaches and although our claims affect the other two, they do 
in different ways.
In this paper, we focus on the way our position challenges Devitt’s 
and we will do so respecting the theoretical and methodological require-
ments that Devitt recommends. We claim that if the semantic type is 
taken into account for regular elements as Devitt defends (e.g. the pro-
vision of a location in the semantic frame of ‘raining’ or the provision of 
a cause in the semantic frame of ‘dying’), the constraints imposed by the 
semantic type of core elements cannot be ignored (e.g. the provision of a 
sentient participant in the semantic frame of ‘waiting’, which cannot be 
the semantic type of a core element in the frame of ‘raining’, for exam-
ple). These type-constraints prevent ill-formed compositions of elements 
such as ‘the man is raining from cancer’ or ‘the table is waiting in Paris’ 
and allow well-formed compositions of elements in a frame as in ‘the 
man is waiting for his check’ or ‘the man is dying from cancer’. Evidence 
for these types of compositional regularities can come, as Devitt argues, 
from corpora elaborated by linguists. Although Devitt does not name 
any specifi c corpus, we suggest that Devitt could use FrameNet3 to sup-
port some of his claims about regularities in the frames of ‘raining’ or 
‘dying’. However, he has not considered the compositional constraints 
for the semantic type of core elements in a frame. A frame is a regular 
schematic linguistic representation of a situation and “[f]rame elements 
[FEs] that are essential to the meaning of a frame are called “core” FEs 
(e.g Speaker in frames connected with communication); expressions of 
time, place and manner are generally not core FEs.” (https://framenet.
icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/glossary). For example, in the frame of ‘tell-
ing’ there are several core elements of certain semantic types: sentient 
speaker, sentient addressee and topic. In the frame of ‘waiting’, its two 
core elements are sentient protagonist and expected event. The two 
core elements in the frame of ‘raining’ are location and time.4 If De-
vitt considered these constraints, he would have to admit these types 
of compositional conventions and their consequences. If he did not, but 
wanted to be consistent, he would owe us some principled way to accept 
the demand of the provision of a location in the frame of ‘raining’ and 
reject the demand of a sentient participant in the frame of ‘waiting’. De-
3 FrameNet provides annotated examples with information about how words 
are used in actual texts. It includes more than 13,000 word senses and more than 
200,000 manually annotated sentences linked to more than 1,200 semantic frames. 
It includes detailed evidence for the combinatorial properties of a core set of the 
English vocabulary.
4 Evidence of these two frames can be found respectively at https://framenet2.
icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Waiting and https://
framenet2.icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Precipitation.
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vitt, however, does not and we think he cannot provide us with such a 
principled distinction and thus he must accept both. In cases where the 
semantic types are not provided, they demand determination in context 
and although the type of contextual adjustment is often slot-fi lling (as in 
the provision of a location for a raining event), in certain cases, it must 
be conceptual modulation as we will see.
Thus, even if we think, as Devitt does, that both pragmatists and 
semanticists have overlooked some linguistic conventions (Romero and 
Soria 2013, 2019), unlike him, we think this is a reason to have a prag-
matic notion of what is said rather than a semantic one. The reason is 
simple: some compositional linguistic rules or conventions of the type 
that Devitt proposes to add sometimes demand modulation to get the 
truth-conditional content of the sentence uttered. Thus, disambigua-
tion and slot-fi lling (or saturation) are not the only ways of exploiting 
linguistic conventions. As we have defended (Romero and Soria 2013, 
2019), modulation may be obligatory and without it, not even satura-
tion is possible in certain cases, cases in which slot-fi lling is dependent 
on modulation. This is a very serious challenge for the traditional view 
that Devitt is trying to save since, if it is right, what is said is not al-
ways literally said.
This paper is divided in two sections. In the next section, we present 
Devitt’s proposal on what is said and the way in which Devitt articu-
lates it. In the third section, we focus on the challenges to Devitt’s se-
mantic notion of what is said. Our disagreement with him leads us to 
provide the arguments for our defence of a pragmatic notion of what is 
said. Finally, we present our conclusions.
2. Devitt’s proposal on what is said
According to Devitt, the study of language is theoretical and empirical 
and this has two consequences. First, we have to analyse theoretically 
interesting notions of meaning: a favoured notion of what is said and 
a notion of what is meant. Second, we need direct evidence from lin-
guistic usage in favour of these notions and not intuitions which are 
themselves theory-laden and open to question.
We have a theoretical interest in human languages as represen-
tational systems constituted by a set of governing rules that people 
use to communicate the contents of their inner states to each other. 
These rules are largely conventional: symbols have their meanings by 
convention. Conventions associated with a linguistic form emerge from 
the regular use in the community of that form to convey certain parts 
of messages. The regular use of a linguistic form in utterances with a 
certain speaker meaning leads to that form having that meaning con-
ventionally in the language of that community.5 The regular use gives 
5 This theoretical approach to meaning is similar to the strategy initiated by 
Grice (1957/89, 1968/89)’s or Schiffer (1972)’s.
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us evidence of linguistic conventions, of semantic properties, if they 
provide the best explanation of regularities. We can gather evidence 
about regularities from linguistics since linguists often acknowledge 
the role of usage as a source of evidence: in the study of corpora and 
elicited production.
The regular use of a linguistic form in utterances with a certain 
speaker meaning somehow leads that form to have that meaning (or 
part of that meaning) conventionally in the language of that commu-
nity. For example, the conventions associated with (1)
(1) It’s raining
come from the regular use of (1) to communicate messages such as that 
it is raining in Granada, that it is raining in NY, that it is raining in 
Dubrovnik, etc. When the speaker believes that it is raining in Grana-
da and she is in Granada, she (in English) produces (1) and this token 
of (1) means that it is raining in Granada. That meaning is the message 
the speaker intentionally communicates, her “speaker meaning”, when 
she is being literal and straightforward. Conventions in these cases 
make reference to what is regularly included, that it is raining [in some 
place to be determined]. These rules show that a theoretically interest-
ing what is said, a what-is-said that may be the content of a mental 
state, is “very tainted” in context. Some linguistic rules demand con-
textual “saturation”; a “slot” should be fi lled as in example (1). The very 
frequent provision of a location in the frame of ‘raining’ can be taken 
as evidence that it obeys a linguistic rule, it is clearly a linguistic regu-
larity recognized in FrameNet. (1) has its representational properties 
partly by virtue of the place where it is raining, by virtue of something 
that is not encoded.
Example (1) is similar to examples that involve words with an in-
dexical or demonstrative element. Their linguistic rules demand satu-
ration in context. For example, the linguistic rule associated to ‘that’ 
captures the convention for expressing the demonstrative part of a 
thought, its encoded meaning, and according to it, a token of the de-
monstrative ‘that’ in an utterance of (2)
(2) That is red
“refers to whatever object is linked to it in the appropriate causal-
perceptual way” (Devitt forthcoming). So the token of ‘that’ in (2) has 
its representational property partly by virtue of something that is not 
encoded, an apple, for example. The demonstrative in (2) straightfor-
wardly semantically designates the apple (in the situation): in using 
‘that’ the speaker had that apple in mind by virtue of her thought being 
causally grounded in it. Having the apple in mind in using ‘that’ simply 
requires that the part of the thought that causes that use of ‘that’ refers 
to the apple in question. What makes an object the referent of ‘that’ is 
its causal relation to the part of the thought expressed by (2). The refer-
ence of ‘that’ is determined by a mental state of the speaker. What is 
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said is often partly constituted by whatever determines the reference of 
any word with an indexical or demonstrative element.
Sometimes more than one linguistic rule governs a symbol. This 
multiplicity arises from multiple conventions for the linguistic form. 
Multiplicity of conventions demands disambiguation and what is said 
takes one of those meanings. In an utterance of (3)
(3) He went to a bank
The speaker is participating in one of the two conventions for ‘bank’. 
Disambiguation is needed to arrive at the representational properties 
that are of theoretical interest. This also shows that a theoretically 
interesting what is said is “very tainted” in context.
The same must be said of (4).
(4) Visiting relatives can be boring 
We are interested in which of the two conventions for ‘visiting relatives’ 
the speaker is participating in. The explanatory role of a particular lin-
guistic form (simple as ‘bank’ or complex as ‘visiting relatives’) depends 
on which rule has been exploited.
Rules related to saturation and disambiguation are in the speaker 
and they are not inferential nor, in any interesting sense, pragmatic. 
They contribute to the theoretically interesting what is said, which, al-
though it is “very tainted” in context, is not pragmatic. The distinction 
between what is said and what is meant guides, according to Devitt, 
the semantics-pragmatics debate.
Taking into account examples (2)–(4), what is said departs from 
the conventional meaning of the sentence when saturation is needed 
or when disambiguation is involved. Saturation and disambiguation 
are linguistically demanded. Devitt and pragmatists do not disagree on 
that, although they disagree in the way disambiguation and saturation 
is reached. According to Devitt, the intentional act that is necessary 
for disambiguation and saturation is not an act of communicating a 
thought as linguistic pragmatists argue but one of expressing a thought.
However, the main point of disagreement comes from their different 
views on some context relative phenomena such as the utterance of (1) 
to say that it’s raining in Granada. For pragmatists truth-conditional 
content depends not only on processes linguistically demanded (manda-
tory) but also on processes non-linguistically demanded (optional) such 
as the pragmatic enrichment required for (1), a case of unarticulated 
constituent. For Recanati, in (1) there is no linguistic demand for the 
provision of a location. The demand is pragmatic through and through 
and yet it is part of what the proposition explicitly communicated, it 
is part of what is pragmatically said. For Devitt, on the contrary, eve-
ry contextual infl uence in what is said by an utterance is necessarily 
taken to be linguistically demanded. (1) linguistically demands slot-
fi lling and not a pragmatic enrichment. From his traditional semantic 
view (or minimalism), the context-relative phenomena that motivate 
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linguistic pragmatism (or contextualism) can be handled by including 
previously overlooked conventions without abandoning its main tenet
that a sentential utterance has its truth-conditional content simply […] in 
virtue of the conventional rules of the speaker’s language. This content is 
typically thought to be “what is said” by the utterance and its constitution 
is thought to be a “semantic” matter. (Devitt 2013: 86)
Devitt’s recognition of context-relative phenomena can be account-
ed for in the minimalist tradition by means of just two qualifi cations. If 
an expression is ambiguous, its contribution to what is said will depend 
on which of its meanings the speaker “has in mind”. When an utterance 
contains an indexical, what is said depends on reference fi xing. For De-
vitt, the constitution of what is said is “semantic” since the representa-
tional properties provided by the linguistic rules only demand determi-
nation in context in cases of disambiguation and slot-fi lling and there 
are no purely pragmatic effects on the truth-conditional content said. 
The traditional semantic view has been questioned by pragmatists 
taking into account (1) and other examples such as
(5) The table [in my room] is covered with books
(6) I’ve had breakfast [this morning]
(7) You are not going to die [from that minor cut]
in which, according to them, pragmatic enrichment (in square brack-
ets) is needed to go from semantic content to what is said. These sen-
tences in context mean what their words mean together with what is 
marked in brackets, while they say something else literally. (5) says 
the absurd claim that there is one and only one table and it is covered 
with books, (6) says that the speaker has had breakfast [sometime in 
the past], (7) attribute immortality to the addressee. As what is said 
by means of these sentences does not coincide with what is meant in 
context, these examples show that “pragmatic” enrichment is needed to 
get what is said from what is “semantically” determined.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, Devitt claims that example (1) does 
not require free pragmatic enrichment to get what is said. (1) would 
be a case of slot-fi lling and thus the result of contextual determina-
tion is a result of a linguistic demand. Evidence that the provision of 
a location obeys a linguistic rule can be found in its very frequent use, 
a very clear linguistic regularity. Similarly, there are conventions for 
expressions included in (5)–(7) that demand saturation in context. The 
convention associated with the referential use of ‘the table’ comes from 
the regular use of (5) to refer to the particular object the speaker has in 
mind, as also happened in the case of ‘that’ in example (2). The conven-
tions associated with (6) come from the regular use of (6) to say that 
the speaker has had breakfast [sometime in the past to be determined]. 
The past tense of the verb phrase requires determination of a specifi c 
past time in context, it must be saturated in context, for example, with 
this morning. What is semantically said by the utterance of (6) is that 
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the speaker has had breakfast this morning. To explain Bach’s famous 
example (7), Devitt also claims that there is a convention demanding 
slot-fi lling. In (7) there is not an indexical such as tense in (6) but there 
is a regular provision of the cause of the death in the use of sentences 
with ‘die’ as the main verb. To make this claim, however, Devitt should 
provide us with some sort of evidence. According to FrameNet, in the 
frame for ‘dying’ there are at least two frequent elements: a core ele-
ment (sentient protagonist) and a non-core element (situation or event 
that led directly to the death).6 Even if it is considered a non-core ele-
ment, the situation or event that led directly to the death is a regular 
sort of information. This type of regularity can be taken as evidence 
for Devitt to argue that there is a normal disposition of the speaker to 
include the event that would (or would not) lead to the death in what 
is said, and thus, in an utterance of (7), what ‘[from that minor cut]’ 
means can be considered as part of what is said.
In this way, the slot-fi lling involved in examples such as (1) and 
(5)–(7) can be considered semantic and, according to Devitt, linguis-
tic pragmatism loses one of its main motivations. Devitt’s criticism of 
pragmatists is that their enlarged what is said is partly “pragmatic” 
(2013: 96). By adding overlooked conventions that demand slot-fi lling, 
he also defends that there is an enlarged what is said in these examples 
but, since slot-fi lling is for him a semantic process, his notion of what 
is said is still semantic.
Linguistic pragmatism, Devitt admits, also takes into account some 
phenomena that demand enrichments or impoverishments of what is 
said such as
(8) The burglar nightmare was over
(9) a. Max cut the grass
 b. Max cut the cake
(10) The ATM swallowed my credit card
Utterances like (8)–(10), in a context, can convey a more precise or less 
precise message than the semantic what is said. These messages are 
achieved by enrichment and impoverishment. The reasons for that, ac-
cording to Devitt, may be that it is ponderous and boring to communi-
cate the precise message using conventions, as in (8), or that the only 
available conventions determine a meaning that is vaguer or narrower 
than the desired message, as in (9) and (10) respectively. 
The truth-conditional content expressed by (8) is an imprecise what 
is said. The imprecise what is said, according to Devitt, would be that 
whatever the relation between burglar and nightmare denotes, the 
burglar nightmare is over. What ‘burglar nightmare’ would thus con-
tribute would be rather imprecise but it will provide the needed con-
straint: anything that is to count as a burglar nightmare has to be of 
that imprecise kind. This constraint is a convention that determines a 
6 See at https://framenet2.icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.
xml?frame=Death.
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vague truth condition that the speaker enriches in a context to get a 
more precise message; the speaker conveys the precise proposition she 
means with the help of the imprecise proposition she expresses.
The truth-conditional content expressed by (9) is also an imprecise 
what is said. ‘Cut’ is seen as referring to what is common to cutting 
grass, cutting cakes, and all other forms of cutting. So, as Devitt (2013: 
96, forthcoming) says following Hale and Keyser (1987), it means 
“something along the lines of produce linear separation in the material 
integrity of something by a sharp edge coming in contact with it”. What 
‘cut’ would thus contribute would be rather imprecise but it could pro-
vide the needed constraint: anything that is to count as a cutting action 
has to be of that rather vague kind.
The enrichment in (8) and (9) is pragmatic. A “pragmatic” mecha-
nism needed to get from what is said to a potential message that is an 
expansion of a semantic what is said; a semantic what is said that is 
truth-conditional and thus truth-conditional pragmatics is not needed. 
In these cases, what is said follows from what is meant.
Impoverishment occurs, according to Recanati (2004: 26), in a token 
of (10). The proposition meant is less precise than the proposition said. 
Devitt follows him in the impoverishment proposal but although (10) 
may once have been a case of impoverishment, he thinks (10) is now a 
dead metaphor and thus disambiguation is the strategy involved. For a 
pragmatist such as Recanati, it is a case of modulation affecting what is 
said. By contrast for Devitt, if it really were a case of impoverishment, 
it would be a case of modulation external to what is said.
Devitt’s putative solutions for explaining what is said by means of 
examples (1) and (5)–(7) are of no use to provide an explanation of (8)–
(10) and he grants a role for pragmatics in their explanation. Each of 
their contents is characterized as what is (semantically) said + prag-
matic modulation (2018: 47, forthcoming). As this type of content is 
characterized in part pragmatically, it represents occasional features 
of linguistic communication.
Linguistic pragmatism also takes into account a metaphorical use 
of examples such as (11),
(11) The rock, now becoming brittle with age, responds to his stu-
dents’ questions with none of his former subtlety (adapted from 
Kittay 1987: 71)
or metonymical uses of examples such as (12) and (13)
(12) The beer faucet is waiting for her second ‘tapa’ (a real utterance 
of a waitress referring to Belén Soria in a tapas bar in Granada 
when she was sitting at the counter by the beer faucet)7
7 This is a novel metonymy similar to the now classical example by Geoffrey 
Nunberg (1979: 149), ‘the ham sandwich is waiting for his check’. Devitt considers 
this example a case of conventional metonymy which should be explained by regular 
polysemy. Cases like this exemplify “meta-conventions, processes for generating 
lexical conventions, of the following form: wherever a convention is established 
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(13) There is a lion in the middle of the piazza (taken from Recanati 
2010: 5)
that are not included in Devitt’s list. These examples hold, according to 
pragmatists, what is pragmatically said. ‘Rock’, ‘beer faucet’, and ‘lion’ 
contribute to what is pragmatically said with a modulated meaning 
in the fi rst case and with extended complex concepts in the other two 
cases.
Nevertheless, Devitt does not consider that these examples chal-
lenge his view of what is said. They are cases in which what the speaker 
means differs from what is said. They convey contents external to what 
is said: they are implicatures, non-literal contents. The speaker says 
something she does not mean as a way of conveying something that she 
does. Devitt handles (11)–(13) arguing that what is said does not have 
to be meant. As he says “the fact that p is what is said by an utterance 
does not entail that p is meant by the utterance (does not entail that p 
is the utterance’s message)” (forthcoming). The metonymical utterance 
of (13), for example, cannot constrain truth conditions different from 
its literal ones. A token of (13) says that there is a lion in the middle 
of the piazza and this semantic content is not included in what the ut-
terance means, that there is a lion statue in the middle of the piazza. 
What is meant does not coincide with what is said. The utterance has 
pragmatic properties. This would be a case of implicature and thus it is 
meant non-literally and indirectly.
In sum, Devitt (2018: 47, forthcoming) has a four-way distinction 
among the properties of utterances: encoded conventional meaning; 
what is said (as a result of encoded conventional meaning, disambigua-
tion and reference assignment); what is said + pragmatic modulation; 
and implicatures. And he considers that two notions of meaning are 
theoretically well based: what is meant and what is said. The ways 
in which what is meant goes beyond encoded conventional meaning 
includes the types of contents shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Devitt’s catalogue of utterance contents
What is meant
= what is said
≠ what 
is said





what is implicated by means of indirect 
or fi gurative uses
that an expression refers to things of type X that expression will also thereby refer 
conventionally to things of related type Y.” (forthcoming). However, (12) is not one 
of the conventional types of regular polysemy and needs a pragmatic explanation.
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In general, there are two possibilities for the notion of what is meant. 
First, what is meant by the uttering of a sentence coincides with what is 
said by the utterance. Then the utterance has only semantic properties. 
The speaker is being literal and straightforward as in Devitt’s explana-
tion of example (1) above. His what-is-said includes many overlooked 
conventions that linguistically demand slot-fi lling as in examples (5)–
(7). Second, what is meant by uttering a sentence does not coincide 
with what is said by the utterance. Then the utterance has pragmatic 
properties. As what is meant can be constituted in two different ways, 
there are two types of contents with pragmatic properties: what is said 
+ modulation and implicatures. While implicatures are purely prag-
matic properties, what is said + modulation is a type of content with 
properties that are only in part pragmatic, those related with the result 
of modulation. Thus, there are different ways in which what is meant 
can depart from what is said:
 – the proposition meant is a precise proposition with the help of 
the imprecise proposition said as examples (8)–(9) show
 – the proposition meant is less precise than the proposition said 
as in (10)
 – the proposition meant is a conversational implicature as in 
(11)–(13).
3. Challenges to Devitt’s semantic notion 
of what is said: Overlooking conventions
Devitt’s semantic notion of what is said includes conventions demand-
ing contextual information which are generally overlooked by both se-
manticists and pragmatists. We are afraid that by adding the kind of 
overlooked conventions that are involved in utterances of (5)–(7), De-
vitt should also include much more in what is said since he has to take 
into account generally overlooked compositional conventions related to 
the metaphorical utterance of (11) or to the metonymical utterance of 
(12). Devitt’s proposal faces an important challenge with examples of 
metaphor and metonymy. This challenge arises because all his require-
ments to save the tradition are really not compatible. It is inconsistent 
to maintain that compositional conventions should not be overlooked 
and to reject non-literal contents as part of what is said in examples 
such as (11). The strategy Devitt follows to defend his overlooked con-
ventions, would lead him, in our opinion, to include in what is said more 
than just the result of disambiguation and saturation if compositional 
conventions are taken into account. The properties that an utterance 
may have as a result of the speaker’s exploitation of her language arise 
not only from encoded conventional meaning together with disambigu-
ation and reference fi xing but also from modulation. Thus a sentential 
utterance has its truth-conditional content not simply by virtue of the 
(largely) conventional rules of the speaker’s language with two impor-
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tant qualifi cations, saturation and disambiguation, since at least one 
other qualifi cation should be included. Some generally overlooked com-
positional conventions often demand modulation to get a proposition, 
both from the point of view of production and interpretation.
Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that Devitt is right about 
the meaning-properties of utterances (1)–(7) and his explanation of 
them. Do we also have to accept that (8)–(10) are adequately explained 
by what is said + pragmatic modulation? To know if examples such 
as (8)–(10) must be considered as cases of what is said + pragmatic 
modulation we need to know fi rst what truth-conditional contents are 
obtained with (8)–(10) that constitute what is said by these utterances 
and, second, what expressions within (8)–(10) are undergoing pragmat-
ic modulation. As we are going to show it would become more consis-
tent for Devitt if saturation in context were used to explain how to get 
the type of what is said by (8) and if disambiguation in context were 
used to explain how to get the type of what is said expressed by (10). 
The only case of what is said + pragmatic modulation would be (9) but 
it is not clear to us why this example is not a case of implicature for 
him. Let us see the problems for Devitt’s treatment of cases (8)–(10).
For us, there is no truth-conditional content obtained with (8) that 
constitutes an imprecise proposition. The problem for Devitt’s proposal 
of an imprecise proposition expressed by (8) is that without specifying 
the relation of burglar with nightmare in context, the restrictive modi-
fi er cannot constrain the denotation of ‘nightmare’ and thus ‘burglar’ 
is not performing its linguistic task. The speaker cannot have in mind 
an imprecise proposition expressed by (8) since there is nothing in com-
mon between the nightmare the burglar has about something and the 
nightmare that a person has about the burglar and thus what seman-
tics delivers for ‘burglar nightmare’ will not be an imprecise part of a 
proposition. There is no imprecise proposition capable of truth evalua-
tion, something the speaker can think of.
If this is so, the content of (8) is merely a set of propositional con-
stituents that has not admitted semantic composition since some sub-
propositional context-dependent component of content (the relation 
between the content of the two nouns) is missing. (8) is similar to (1) 
and ‘burglar nightmare’ expresses a constituent of what is said that 
results from a semantic addition demanded by a convention exploited 
by the speaker, the convention for N+N construction. The speaker of (8) 
participates in a convention with the use of ‘burglar nightmare’ as far 
as what is regularly delivered by the semantics of this N+N construc-
tion is the meaning of ‘nightmare [in some relation with] burglar [to be 
determined]’. But this does not determine a vague part of a truth condi-
tion that the speaker enriches to convey a more precise message. Thus, 
‘burglar nightmare’ in a token of (8) is not a case of modulation. Nei-
ther the meaning of ‘nightmare’ nor the meaning of ‘burglar’ undergoes 
pragmatic enrichment. Devitt’s explanation of the content conveyed by 
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the utterance of (8), what is said + pragmatic modulation, is not plau-
sible. We think it would be more consistent for Devitt to argue that (8) 
is a context-relative phenomenon more similar to (1) and (5)–(7) than to 
cases of what is said + pragmatic modulation in the sense that its con-
vention in relation to the N+N construction establish a slot to be fi lled 
in context: the relation that nightmare bears to burglar.
(9) is also considered by Devitt as a case in which its truth-condi-
tional content is imprecise and becomes precise by the pragmatic en-
richment of ‘cut’. Although it is an extension or elaboration of a constit-
uent of the proposition said, Devitt considers it external to what is said. 
In this way, he can maintain his main point: “the semantic what-is-said 
that is thus expanded is already truth-conditional and so there is no 
place here for “truth-conditional pragmatics”.” (forthcoming). However, 
why are utterances of (9a) and (9b) considered cases of what is said + 
pragmatic modulation rather than implicatures? 
Let’s look at an utterance of (10). Although he said that this is a 
case of impoverishment, he also claims that this utterance is a case of 
conventional metaphor. Thus, Devitt thinks it expresses a truth-condi-
tional content that depends on disambiguation and constitutes what is 
semantically said by this utterance; it literally says that the ATM swal-
lowed the credit card. In this sense, Devitt does not provide us with a 
good example of impoverishment.
We could use examples of novel metaphors such as the metaphorical 
utterance of (11), which, according to Recanati (2004), is a case of im-
poverishment as well. However, for us, no truth-conditional content is 
obtained with an utterance of (11) that constitutes what is said and has 
to be impoverished. According to our conventions, in (11), ‘responds’ 
should express a property of animate beings (a sentient speaker).8 This 
is similar to Devitt’s claim that there are conventions demanding slots 
to be fi lled by a location in (1), a time in (6), a cause in (7) and, as we say 
he should admit, a relation in (8) to get the truth-conditional content. 
In Devitt’s slot-fi lling proposal, the slots must be fi lled with entities of 
a certain semantic type if they are to count as conventions to get the 
truth-conditional content. Type constraints are part of linguistic regu-
larities as we can see in FrameNet. Taking into account the evidence 
from this corpus, location is the regular type to fi ll the slot in (1) and 
cause is the regular type to fi ll the slot in (7) but the cause cannot fi ll 
in the slot in (1). When these type constraints affect core-elements they 
can be taken as linguistic rules (Asher 2011, Romero and Soria 2019). 
For instance, the verb ‘wait’ demands a sentient participant as subject 
of the VP in the active form. If we take into account these composi-
tional linguistic rules, composition of the semantic constituents of (11) 
is precluded by normal type constraints and a pragmatic adjustment is 
demanded.
8 Evidence of this frame can be found at https://framenet2.icsi.berkeley.edu/
fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Communication_response.
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In addition, the pronoun ‘his’ carries gender and number features 
which constrain the antecedent of the anaphor and which must be mas-
culine. However, the object referred to by the token of the NP, the rock, 
is not of the semantic type required by ‘responds’ and cannot be an 
acceptable antecedent of ‘his’. (11) shows lack of semantic coordina-
tion between the meaning of the NP, the rock, and the meaning of ‘re-
sponds’ and thus their composition is not possible. Thus, no resulting 
truth-conditional meaning can be expected to represent a thought with 
both of them as constituents. The speaker is not doing, Devitt would 
say, “what she is normally disposed to do.” She is “deliberately assign-
ing another meaning to an expression, as in metaphor or pragmatic 
modulation” (forthcoming). In his defence of the tradition, however, he 
rejects that this difference in meaning may affect what is said. By con-
trast, we claim it does and examples like (11) challenge his defence in a 
serious way since modulation of the meaning of ‘rock’ is here necessary 
for the slot-fi lling of ‘his’.
In (11), ‘his’ demands a slot-fi lling through anaphor resolution and 
anaphor resolution is guided by linguistic rules of agreement. This 
agreement is possible in (11) only with the modulated meaning the 
speaker has in mind rather than with the encoded meaning. If the 
speaker had used ‘the rock’ to refer to a rock, the speaker would have 
uttered ‘the rock (…) responds to its students’ rather than ‘the rock (…) 
responds to his students’ to get the agreement that the rules of lan-
guage require. However, the speaker of (11) uses ‘the rock’ to refer to 
the old professor she has in mind and this partly determines its mean-
ing in the appropriate causal-perceptual way. The old professor behav-
iour has prompted the speaker to conceive the professor metaphorically 
as a rock getting brittle with age and the best way to represent the 
metaphorical thought she has in mind is with the metaphorical utter-
ance of (11). The metaphorical use of ‘the rock’ is causally grounded 
in the speaker’s metaphorical conceptualization of the professor and 
by her use of ‘his’ rather than ‘its’, she participates in a convention 
grounded in this metaphorical conceptualization. In cases like this, 
saturation depends on modulation. If the truth-conditional meaning 
of an indexical is partly determined by what the speaker has in mind 
and what she has in mind is a metaphorically conceptualized professor, 
she produces a metaphorical utterance through a regular mechanism, 
the metaphorical, which is quite systematic in language use. In (11), 
the speaker selects ‘his’ rather than ‘its’ to represent her metaphorical 
thought. Thus, modulation cannot be external to what is said on pain of 
ungrammaticality. (11) is a well-formed metaphorical utterance and it 
would be ill-formed if taken literally. We do not think the content of an 
ill-formed literal utterance corresponds with what the speaker has in 
mind. In (11) what is said is metaphorically said. This can be claimed if 
we accept that compositional conventions demand modulation to solve 
the lack of semantic coordination. But by adding this type of conven-
tions we are opposing both pragmatists and Devitt’s traditional view. 
For all of them, the derivation of metaphorical meanings is never lin-
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guistically demanded. But if metaphorical modulation is optional, what 
is the propositional literal content that the speaker has in mind in (11)? 
A rock which has students and can respond to their questions? We think 
this is inconsistent for Devitt if compositional rules are recognised con-
ventions. Lack of semantic coordination indicates context-dependence 
which demands pragmatic adjustment. Conventions tell us that a sen-
tient entity is needed to be able to compose a full content for (11). The 
speaker is deliberately assigning some (abnormal) meaning to ‘rock’ 
so that composition is allowed in a regular way. The resolution of this 
compositional context-dependence cannot be treated as part of seman-
tics. A pragmatic process is needed to make composition possible since 
although the speaker participates in the convention when using the 
word ‘rock’ she is exploiting it metaphorically to express the metaphori-
cal concept the speaker has in mind, the speaker is also participating 
in the compositional conventions by her selection of the verb ‘respond’ 
and the pronoun ‘his’ to coordinate semantically with the metaphorical 
conceptualization the speaker has in mind.
Without the modulated meaning, there is no literal proposition for 
(11), no impoverishment (or any other type of modulation) of the concept 
ROCK can be added as something external to what is said. Recanati is 
right when he includes modulation in what is said and argues for what is 
pragmatically said. Where Recanati is wrong is in his defence of impov-
erishment as the result of a pragmatic process that is always optional. 
Modulation in the utterance of (11) is compositionally and linguistically 
demanded. If this is so, to handle (11), Devitt’s theoretically interesting 
notion of what is said has to be modifi ed since this utterance does not 
have a truth-conditional content simply by virtue of the conventional 
rules of the speaker’s language, disambiguation and saturation.
However, Devitt might defend his position by saying that (11) is not 
a case of impoverishment but of transfer and that transfer is involved 
in implicature. (11) would not be a challenge for his what-is-said + 
pragmatic modulation after all. This defence has two problems, though. 
The fi rst problem is that if transfer is involved in implicature, we do 
not understand why (9), a case of enrichment, is not also a case of im-
plicature. Transfer together with enrichment and impoverishment are 
the optional pragmatic processes that characterize the notion of what 
is pragmatically said. If transfer goes to implicature, enrichment and 
impoverishment should go too. The reason, we suppose, why enrich-
ment, a type of content external to what is said, is not included in im-
plicature is that modulation affects the meaning of a word and not the 
meaning of the uttered sentence but this also happens with transfer. 
The second problem is that implicature and what is said + pragmatic 
modulation presuppose in Devitt’s theory a semantic what is said, but 
in (11) what is said cannot be obtained without pragmatic modulation.9
9 Devitt does not include transfer as a case of modulation. If transfer is involved 
in implicature and it is characteristic of metaphor, why does Devitt understand 
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As whatever process is involved in metaphor, it is compositionally 
and linguistically demanded to get what is said in cases such as (11), 
the result of impoverishment or transfer in these cases is not added to 
what is said simply because there is no literal what is said. In cases 
such as (11) the result of these pragmatic processes is not an impli-
cature for the same reason. The result must be included in what is 
said; a proposition said that can be an input for implicatures. To the 
extent that in (11) there is no semantic proposition said and that what 
the speaker has in mind is a metaphorical thought, there are reasons to 
think that in those cases the proposition is a metaphorical proposition 
and what is said is metaphorically said. The proposition said is non-
literal and this is not acceptable for the traditional view that maintains 
that what is said is always literally said.
Example (12) shares some properties with (11). The type of core 
elements involved in the frame of waiting are a sentient protagonist 
and an expected event. The pronoun ‘her’ carries gender and number 
features which constrain the antecedent of the anaphor that must be 
feminine (but no acceptable antecedent is expressed). (12) shows lack 
of semantic coordination between the meaning of the NP, ‘the beer 
faucet’, and the conventional constraints imposed by ‘waiting’ and 
‘her’. No explicit NP of the type required (sentient protagonist) is ex-
pressed and no feminine acceptable antecedent for ‘her’ is expressed. 
Thus composition of their encoded meanings is not available. There are 
conventions for (12) as complex expressions that compositionally and 
linguistically demand contextual information. There is compositional 
context-sensitivity.
What expressions in (12) are undergoing modulation according to 
pragmatists? If we follow pragmatists such as Recanati, ‘beer faucet’ 
has to undergo transfer. Nonliterality is attributable to a specifi c ex-
pression, ‘beer faucet’, and its meaning is what must be changed. ‘Beer 
faucet’ non-literally means ‘beer faucet customer’. Conventions tell us 
that a sentient entity is needed to be able to compose a full content for 
(12). The speaker is deliberately assigning some (abnormal) meaning to 
‘beer faucet’ so that composition is allowed in a regular way.
We think instead, in a spirit more coherent with Devitt’s proposal, 
that saturation in context can be used to go from a non-propositional 
semantic content to what is said in (12). The meaning of ‘the beer fau-
cet’ must work as part of the restrictive modifi er of [customer] to say 
that the customer by the beer faucet is waiting for her second tapa. 
A new kind of slot-fi lling appears. ‘Beer faucet’ means ‘beer faucet’ 
and ‘the beer faucet’ has in (12) its representational property partly 
by means of the object the speaker has in mind, the customer by the 
beer faucet. In Devitt’s vein, it could be said that this utterance has a 
truth-conditional content simply by virtue of the conventional rules of 
impoverishment, the process involved in novel metaphor according to Recanati, as a 
case of what is said + modulation? His two proposals on metaphor are not coherent.
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the speaker’s language, disambiguation and saturation. Nevertheless, 
what is semantically said by (12) is non-literal. Again we have a case of 
what is non-literally said.
In order to handle (11)–(12), Devitt’s theoretically interesting no-
tion of what is said needs to include either modulation or a new kind of 
slot-fi lling. In these cases, the pragmatic adjustment is demanded con-
ventionally due to compositional context-sensitivity (Romero and Soria 
2013 and 2019) and it has to be included in what is (pragmatically and 
non-literally) said. At the end of the day, the properties of these types of 
utterances are linguistically demanded but inevitably pragmatic.
Additional evidence to show that these properties are inevitably 
pragmatic is that the metonymical property of the utterance of (12) 
should be of the same nature as the metonymical property of any me-
tonymy. This means that the metonymical use of (13) should include 
a non-literal and expanded meaning for ‘lion’ as a result of the new 
kind of slot-fi lling. However, a token of (13) does not conventionally 
demand this slot-fi lling and any contextual effect not conventionally (or 
optionally) demanded by an utterance constitutes without any doubt a 
pragmatic property. A similar argument could be made if we think of a 
metaphorical use of (13).
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have explained Devitt’s semanticist position and how 
it depends on including more conventions in the constitution of what is 
said. Although we have also defended that there are overlooked conven-
tions, we cannot agree with Devitt’s “semantic” notion of what is said 
since the properties that an utterance has simply as a result of the 
speaker’s exploitation of the conventions of her language sometimes 
demand contextual modulation and not only disambiguation and satu-
ration.
We have argued that modulation may be demanded by conventions 
which constrain the compositionality of complex expressions (phrases 
and sentences) and that Devitt’s way of delineating the constitution of 
what is said by including more conventions leads him further than he 
would be ready to accept in his defence of traditional truth-conditional 
semantics for which what is said is always literally said. Some of the 
overlooked conventions Devitt is trying to highlight have a composi-
tional character and if he attempts to include them in the semantic 
constitution of what is said without being unsystematic, he should pro-
vide a principled way to justify why certain types of exploitation of 
linguistic conventions are accepted in the determination of what is said 
(disambiguation and saturation) and others are not (modulation) and 
why certain types of conventions are accepted in some cases (e.g. the 
provision of a location in the frame of ‘raining’) while they are rejected 
in other cases (e.g. the requirement of a sentient protagonist in the 
frame of ‘waiting’). If there is not a principled way to discard certain 
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compositional conventions, the wider semantic notion of what is said 
that he proposes will not be viable.
If the theoretical reason to include the resolution of context-sensi-
tivity in what is said is that, if we didn’t, there would be no way to at-
tribute the speaker a thought in order to explain his behaviour, and the 
overlooked conventions include (as we argue) compositional demands 
for contextual (non-linguistic) information, Devitt should accept that 
modulation and certain types of slot-fi lling (excluded in the traditional 
semantic approach) must be included in what is said. In certain cases, 
the semantic role of a core-element can match other constituents only 
if there is a conceptual adjustment of the encoded meaning as in meta-
phorical modulation or a metonymical slot-fi lling. In these cases, what 
semantics delivers is not something that the speaker can mentally rep-
resent as something capable of being true. This is especially evident 
when saturation is dependent on modulation. If what the speaker has 
in mind is a metaphorical thought, the encoded meaning undergoes 
modulation through transfer and the speaker expresses a metaphorical 
truth-conditional content. If what the speaker has in mind is a complex 
concept and expresses it by means of a sub-phrasal constituent of a 
sentence, the speaker is expressing part of a thought metonymically. In 
both cases, what is said is non-literally said. However, if compositional 
conventions demand that the result of metaphorical modulation and 
metonymical complex concepts are included in what is said, we think 
that even Devitt would fi nd it better to call the resolution of context-
sensitivity “pragmatic” rather than “semantic”. If we want to give a 
systematic account of the properties of utterances, we need a pragmatic 
notion of what is said.
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